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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY & NOV !! OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350

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17 November 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subj: Consolidated Guidance - ACTION MEMORANDUM

As I mentioned during yesterday's meeting on your forthcoming guidance memorandum, we very much appreciated the opportunity to give you our views on how it might best be developed and what we should most like to see in its content. In order to provide you with a fuller picture of our recommendations on Consolidated Guidance I am enclosing two papers, one of which I sent to Russ earlier. They highlight a number of problems which seem to us of particular.

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The first attachment is a copy of a memorandum which comments on proposed change to the existing Defense Guidance. In essence, I believe that:

- The proposed Defense Guidance contains several changes which, taken together, constitute reduced defense posture and commitment to Allied defense.
- The more significant of these changes include a proposed shift in naval force sizing and structuring criteria away from Case 1, removal of the maritime strategy objective of maintaining US/Allied superiority and lack of consideration of the Soviet threat to the NATO flanks.

In the second enclosure, I have attached our views on the kind of changes we believe are needed in the content of previous guidance papers.

- In sum, we recommend more specificity in certain areas with less complexity and fewer data requirements in the overall package.

We will study your list of selected issues with great care and will continue to work along the lines we discussed at the meeting.

- Where selected issues require your special emphasis and funding guidance, we recommend that the guidance be given to emphasize specific programmatic issues, when possible, rather than by setting rigid funding levels for total program areas. Where funding guidance is required for such programmatic issues, we recommend you direct a desired funding range rather than a single, specific dollar amount.

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In addition, as you suggested, we stand ready for, and are looking forward to, a further discussion of the Naval Aviation Modernization program.

Finally, in the development of your guidance and in the resolution of other issues, I hope you will continue to let us work closely with you and your staff. I am sure that the system works much better when we do.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Secretary of the Navy

Attachments

Copy to:

Mr. Duncan

Dr. Perry

Mr. Wacker

Mc. McGiffert

Mr. Murray

Dr. White

Amb. Komer

LGEN Smith

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

SEP 2 1 2015



## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350



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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

SEP 2 1 2015

15 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION)

Subj: Defense Guidance

Encl: (1) Recommended Line-in/Line-out Changes and Comments

DNC

The draft update to the Defense Guidance (DG) that you asked for comments on is sufficiently broad to permit flexibility in planning and in many respects the draft improves upon it. There are, however, several changes which, taken together, constitute reduced defense posture and commitment to Alliance defense. The more significant changes include the proposed shift in naval force sizing and structuring criteria away from Case 1, removal of the maritime strategy objective of maintaining US/Allied superiority and lack of consideration of the Soviet threat to the NATO flanks. An additional concern is the increased dependence of strategic mobility forces on overseas bases for non-European conflicts.

With regard to the proposed shift in criteria for the sizing of naval forces, I believe this change to be precature since it anticipates the outcome of the Naval Force Planning Study. The change recommended in the enclosure appropriately describes the unique role of naval forces in providing presence and crisis management capability and also accommodates the military functions these forces must provide in the event of a Case I conflict. In this regard, while the proposed draft reduces somewhat the emphasis placed on defense of the Central Front of NATO, it remains silent on the issue of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the Northern and Southern flanks of NATO. The change that I propose considers this vital aspect of the Case I conflict.

I believe the strategy defined in last year's DG of required US/
Allied maritime superiority to deter or defeat the Soviet threat to be
valid; otherwise, the U.S. goal of maintaining freedom of the seas is
brought into question. Therefore, I feel that a concise expression of
the requirement for naval superiority should remain an integral part of
the update for naval forces planning guidance. Lastly, the Draft guidance
indicates a softening in requirements for strategic mobility forces in
that it calls for capabilities which depend, to an increased degree, on
overseas bases. The change proposed in the enclosure addresses the need
for these forces to be less dependent on overseas bases — a change
consistent with Presidential Decision-18.

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The enclosure contains details of these changes, as well as changes proposed for strategic forces, alert status, land forces reinforcement in Europe and war reserve munitions.

In sum, it is the Navy's view that the draft update to the DG reflects an increased emphasis on short war planning and downplays the contributions of naval forces to a NATO conflict. Such modifications are substantive and serious in their implications and, in our judgment, require more extensive analysis, review and assessment of all related factors. In this regard, the Naval Force Planning Study will provide the framework and opportunity for the dialogue essential to such a reassessment. I recommend that SECDEF not preempt the findings of these studies by promulgating major changes in our military strategy before they are completed.

W. Wilson Claytonle

W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Secretary of the Navy

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